David J. Berney co-authored this article with Timothy Gilsbach, Esquire, for a continuing legal education presentation.
The IDEA provides a series of procedural and substantive protections for parents and their children with qualifying disabilities. In considering an IDEA complaint, the hearing officer is supposed to make his/her decision “on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the child received a free appropriate public education.” “In matters alleging a procedural violation, a hearing officer may only find that a child did not receive a free appropriate public education” if the procedural violations resulted in substantive harm. This statutory divide codifies a distinction that courts historically drew, pre-IDEA amendment, between so-called “substantive” and “procedural” violations.
Throughout the history of the IDEA, courts have seemingly struggled with demarcating clear differences between procedural and substantive violations of the Act. The case law abounds with conflicting examples of what constitutes a procedural as opposed to a substantive violation of the IDEA. In addition, there is confusion as to whether certain procedural violations will ultimately entitle a parent or student to compensatory-type relief. A large part of this conceptual muddle stems from the language of the IDEA itself. The IDEA imposes a detailed set of procedural requirements that are closely related to if not inextricably intertwined with its substantive guarantees.
Thus, while the procedural/substantive inquiry arises from the construction and framework of the statute, the confusion is an outgrowth of the Act’s vague substantive guarantees and the failure of the Act to articulate the differences between a procedural versus a substantive violation.
The seminal case that concretized the procedural/substantive dichotomy and provided a legal framework for analyzing these different IDEA violations was Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley. Rowley established and defined a substantive right to FAPE, thereby providing some guidance to courts trying to distinguish procedural from substantive violations. FAPE requires that the state provide specialized instruction with sufficient supports and services to permit a child to benefit educationally from such instruction.
Rowley also put forth a two-pronged inquiry for courts considering an IDEA lawsuit based upon the alleged denial of FAPE. First, a court must consider whether the state has satisfied the IDEA’s procedural requirements. Second, the court must consider whether the child’s educational program was reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits. By implying that procedural violations can amount to a denial of FAPE, the first prong of this test provides some clarity about the consequences of such violations. However, it also raised the question as to what types of procedural violations do indeed deny FAPE.
II. Substantive vs. Procedural Violations
A substantive violation arises under the IDEA where the substantive content, such as the educational services, contained in the IEP, is insufficient to afford FAPE. Procedural violations occur when the LEA fails to comply with the Act’s process-based requirements. Since Rowley, courts have generally viewed violations as substantive when they involve: 1) IEP compliance, 2) the least restrictive learning environment, or 3) the adequacy of the individualized instructions and educational supports contained in an IEP. Conversely, courts have typically viewed failures to properly carry out the processes for identifying students with disabilities and developing IEP’s as procedural violations. More specifically, violations regarding “Child Find,” evaluations and violations involving the specific processes for developing IEP services, supports, and goals are viewed as procedural violations. While the IDEA’s procedural protections are, for the most part, explicitly laid out in the statute, its substantive guarantees are generally undefined by statute and have largely been developed through the courts.
Rowley established that students with disabilities have a right to an IEP that is reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit. At first blush, this substantive standard would appear to govern all aspects involving the IEP, including the adequacy of IEP goals, requirements for progress reports, and descriptions of educational services. However, courts generally have only considered and utilized the “substantive standard” where the alleged violation involves the individualized instruction, educational supports, and other aspects of an IEP that actually make up a child’s special education curriculum.
In D.S. v. Bayonne Board of Education, the parents asserted that the school district violated the IDEA by failing to provide proper modifications and accommodations to their son’s educational curriculum. Parents claimed their son needed more intensive accommodations than extended time on tests, a highly structured environment, drilling and repetitive practice, and the use of a multi-sensory approach. The court held this to be a substantive claim, stating, “the content of an IEP as such does not implicate the IDEA’s procedural requirements, for [such] content is concerned with the IEP’s substance.”
Likewise, the Court in L.R. v. Manheim Township School District found a claim regarding the content of a child’s IEP to be substantive in nature where the plaintiffs asserted that their child’s IDEA rights were violated because the child’s IEP did not include sufficient language therapy or an adequate one-on-one aid.
In Rodrigues v. Fort Lee Board of Education, the plaintiffs asserted that their child’s IDEA rights were violated because her IEP did not include measurable goals or adequate descriptions of transition services. Although the plaintiffs’ claim involved components of their child’s IEP, the Court found that their claims implicated a procedural violation, presumably because the violations involved process oriented aspects of the IDEA, such as creating goals and describing services
Since Rowley, several courts have held that a failure to implement material aspects of an IEP is a substantive violation of the IDEA. In Van Duyn ex. rel. v. Baker School District, plaintiffs alleged that their child was denied FAPE because his school did not provide the math instruction required by his IEP and it failed to properly implement his behavior management plan. The Court found these claims to allege substantive violations of the IDEA.
Least Restrictive Environment
Post-Rowley, courts have also held that a failure to educate a student in the least restrictive environment is a substantive violation of the IDEA. In Daniel R.R. v. State Board of Education, the parents filed suit against their son’s school district claiming that it violated the IDEA by placing him in an isolated special education class when he could satisfactorily participate in regular education. The Court held that the parents’ claim was substantive.
School districts have a continuing obligation under the IDEA—called Child Find—to identify and evaluate all students who are reasonably suspected of having a disability. Several courts have held a violation of this duty to be procedural.
In School Board of City of Norfolk v. Brown, the Court found that the school district committed a procedural violation of the IDEA when it failed to identify the student’s disability after the student was reported by school officials for harassing other students, was suspended three times for disciplinary reasons, and was referred to a behavioral program that recommended the student receive behavioral support services. Brown demonstrates the difficulty in distinguishing procedural violations from substantive violations as the Court also found that the school’s procedural violation arose to a substantive violation of the IDEA due to its effect on the contents of the student’s IEP.
The IDEA lays out a variety of protections that apply to evaluations. For example, the Act requires states to conduct a “full and individual initial evaluation” before special education services are provided to a child. It also requires the state to determine whether a child has a disability within 60 days of receiving parental consent for the evaluation. Id. Courts have found these and other protections applicable to the evaluation process to be procedural in nature.
IEP Development Process
There are several types of protections that apply to the process of developing an IEP, including requirements that parents be involved in the process, that IEP teams have a proper composition, that parents receive notice of changes to an IEP, and that the process be undertaken within a certain time period. Failure to comply with these protections are typically construed as procedural violations.
In L.G. ex rel. E.G. v. Fair Lawn Board of Education, Fair Lawn held an IEP team meeting and drafted an IEP without L.G.’s parents present. L.G.’s parents claimed this violated L.G.’s rights under the IDEA. The Court characterized the plaintiff’s claim as procedural in nature. In R.B., ex rel. F.B. v. Napa Valley Unified School District, the court also found a failure to include at least one special education teacher on a child’s IEP team to be procedural in nature.
III. Consequences of Substantive and Procedural Violations
Substantive violations typically amount to denials of FAPE, thereby entitling parents and students to compensatory relief. Procedural violations, on the other hand, can entitle a party to injunctive or compensatory relief depending on the effect of the violation. With respect to procedural violations, it has been explained, “[t]he initial procedural inquiry in an IDEA case ‘is not mere formality,’ as ‘adequate compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP.’” However, it is important to note that “a procedural violation does not necessarily mean the child failed to receive FAPE and that relief is warranted.”
A procedural violation can only lead to a compensatory-type remedy such as compensatory education and/or tuition reimbursement when it constitutes a denial of FAPE by causing “substantive harm to the child or his [or her] parents.” More specifically, the IDEA provides that a procedural violation will only amount to a denial of FAPE if it: “ impeded the child’s right to a free appropriate public education;  significantly impeded the parents’ opportunity to participate in the decision making process regarding the provision of a free appropriate public education to the parents’ child; or  caused a deprivation of educational benefit.” However, where the violation is a “mere technical contravention of the IDEA”, retrospective relief will not be awarded. Where the procedural violation does not cause substantive harm to the student or impede parents’ opportunity to participate, a court may award injunctive relief, ordering the LEA to prospectively comply with the procedural provision in question, but cannot award compensatory education or tuition reimbursement. Finally, it has been noted that “[m]ultiple procedural violations may cumulatively result in the denial of a FAPE even if the violations considered individually do not.”
As detailed in the examples below, whether a specific procedural violation meets this standard or not has been found to vary significantly depending upon the facts of the case. As a result, identifying a guiding principle for when a procedural violation entitles a party to relief is difficult. However, procedural violations that courts generally find to entitle parents and students to relief appear to consistently possess two characteristics. First, such violations typically involve a district’s failure to collaborate with parents in developing an IEP, to individualize the IEP process to the child’s needs, or both of these issues. Second, the failure involves more than a short delay in meeting a statutorily imposed deadline, is not of a temporary nature, and affects the district’s IEP decision-making process or the services the child receives.
Violations that Entitle Parents or Student to Relief
In each of the cases discussed in this section, school districts were found to have engaged in procedural violations that entitled parents to relief. In each case, parents were denied the opportunity for meaningful participation in the development of their child’s IEP and the violations did not involve short delays in meeting deadlines, were not of a temporary nature, and had an effect on the IEP decision-making process or the services the child received.
In Deal v. Hamilton County Board of Education, the Court found the district’s procedural violation of predetermining not to offer ABA services to the child to be a denial of FAPE. According to the Court, the evidence showed that the district had no intention of even considering the type of ABA program that the parents were requesting and made this decision before the IEP meeting, making the parent’s participation meaningless and a violation of the parents’ rights. While this violation may appear substantive because the district denied the child a type of educational service, the core of the parents’ claim was procedural in that it involved the district’s failure to properly carry out the IEP development process.
In the case of County School Board of York County, Virginia v. A.L., the Court found that the LEA’s failure to notify the parents that it had removed VAAP, a state alternative testing system, from the student’s IEP, was improper. The Court reasoned that the failure to include this in the student’s IEP led to a loss of educational benefit and the failure to provide prior written notice to the parents of its intent to remove VAAP from the student’s IEP denied them meaningful participation in the IEP process. As in Deal, the district’s failure in A.L. to include an educational service in the student’s IEP seems to implicate a substantive violation. However, the core of the parents’ claim in this case also involved the district failing to properly carry out the IEP development process, rather than the district failing to offer an IEP that would result in educational benefit.
In the case of Singletary v. Cumberland County Schools, the Court found that the parents had been denied meaningful participation in the IEP process because the rest of the IEP team had predetermined the substance of the student’s IEP, and as a result, the parents were denied the opportunity to provide additional information that might be helpful for the team in developing the student’s IEP.
In the case of Central Dauphin School District, the Hearing Officer found that the failure to hold a meeting to discuss the student’s ER and IEP was a procedural violation that made the ER and IEP flawed. As a result, when combined with substantive problems with the IEP, the Hearing Officer found that the procedural violation lead to a denial of a FAPE.
In each of the cases discussed in this section, school districts had committed procedural violations by failing to abide by IDEA mandated processes that impacted the students’ needs.
In Deal, in addition to finding that the district deprived the parents of meaningful participation in the IEP process, the Court held that the district’s procedural violation in failing to have a regular education teacher present at the child’s IEP meeting to be a fatal error that caused substantive harm, and therefore, established a denial of a FAPE. The Court found that the failure to include a regular education teacher, who could have added a unique perspective to the team, as part of the IEP team was a violation given that the level of inclusion that would be provided for the student as part of his IEP was discussed at the meeting.
In M.L. v. v. Federal Way School District, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals used the same analysis as in Deal and found that the failure to include a regular education teacher as part of the IEP team rendered the proposed IEP flawed.
The Court in Davis v. Wappingers Central School District found that the school district’s failure to (1) have all of the appropriate personnel on the IEP team, (2) consider appropriate evaluative data for the student, and (3) “timely implement the IEP,” denied the student FAPE by “imped[ing] parental participation in the formulation of the IEP and [by] den[ying] the student educational benefits.” The court reasoned that because the IEP team was not properly composed, there was no one present who could (1) answer parent’s questions about the curriculum and (2) suggest any proposed modifications the curriculum to benefit student.
In Babb v. Knox County School System, the school district performed an incomplete evaluation of a student and then concluded that the student was not handicapped. The Court found that the district’s failure to examine the student’s complete academic, psychological, and behavioral history was a procedural violation that amounted to a denial of FAPE.
Procedural Violations found not to entitle Parents or Student to relief
As suggested in the previous section, procedural violations that do not result in relief for parents and students typically involve short delays in meeting statutorily imposed deadlines, are of a temporary nature, or do not affect the IEP decision-making process or the services received by the child.
In the case of C.H. v. Cape Henlopen School District, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the parents that the school district had committed two procedural violations, but found the violations did not rise to the level of a denial of FAPE and, accordingly, denied the parents tuition reimbursement. First, the Court was asked to address the LEA’s failure to have an IEP in place on the first day of the school year in violation of 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(A). The Court found that because the child in fact never attended school in the district, as the parents enrolled the student in a private school, and the district had attempted to and was prepared to offer an IEP, this did not result in an educational harm to the student. Second, the parents alleged that the district had failed to provide them timely notice of an IEP meeting. In considering this procedural violation, the Court found that the parents attended the IEP meeting without objection and that there was no evidence that the timeframe of the notice had any effect on the ability of the parents to participate in the meeting. The Second Court of Appeals reached the same result with respect to the failure to have an IEP in place at the beginning of the school year in M.M. v. School District of Greenville County.
In L.M. v. Capistrano Unified School District parents contended that they were denied meaningful participation in the IEP process because their chosen expert was limited to a twenty (20) minute observation of the proposed classroom. Given that the expert in question explained that even given such time limits, she was able to develop an opinion, advise the parent and testify at hearing, the Court found that this violation was merely procedural and technical in nature and did not deprive the parents of the meaningful opportunity to participate in the IEP process.
In K.L.A. v. Windham Southeast Supervisory Union, the Court found that the failure to have one of the student’s regular education teachers present at all IEP meetings was not fatal to the IEP, because he attended some meetings and the requirement for this role at IEP meeting is subject to the limitation that it requires only that the regular education teacher needs to be present “as appropriate.” In addition, the Court found that even had the regular education teacher been present, there is simply no evidence that the team would have recommended a different placement.
In the case of Patterson v. District of Columbia, parents challenged the adequacy of the Student’s transition plan and sought to amend it. The court found the issue was moot because by the time the case was before the district court, the school district had issued a new transition plan that complied with the IDEA. In dicta, the Court noted that even if the old transition plan had been inadequate, the temporary imposition of it was a mere procedural violation that had not affected the student’s substantive rights.
There is a two-part inquiry that hearing officers and courts must use to consider IDEA claims. First, is the parent alleging a procedural or substantive violation? Second, if it is a procedural claim, did the violation lead to a substantive violation or was it merely technical in nature? Unless the claim focuses on the substance of the student’s special education curriculum it will typically be viewed as procedural. If the alleged violation is a technical procedural violation, then the plaintiff will only be entitled to injunctive relief. However, if the violation significantly interferes with the parents’ participation in the development of the IEP or causes harm to the student, then the parents and/or student will be entitled to compensatory relief.
As with all legal constructs, this substantive/procedural line is unsatisfying in many ways. Violations that seem substantive are sometimes labeled as procedural. Adding further confusion to the analysis, procedural violations are only treated as such until they are found to have a substantive effect. Given the implications of a claim being labeled as procedural versus substantive, it is important for practitioners to understand the nuances of this analysis. However, even with such an understanding, the difficulties inherent in the procedural/substantive framework will continue to lead you to say “procedural” while I say “substantive”.
 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i).
 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii).
 See Jon Romberg, The Means Justify the Ends: Structural Due Process in Special Education Law, 48 Harv. J. on Legis. 415, 425-30 (2011).
 See id at 425.
 Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cnty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 203-4 (1982).
 Id at 206-7.
 Id. See also C.H. v. Cape Henlopen Sch. Dist., 606 F.3d 59, 66 (3d Cir. 2010) citing Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Central Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-207 (1982); Deal v. Hamilton County Board of Education, 392 F.3d 840, 853-54 (6th Cir. 2004); M.L. v. Federal Way Sch. Dist., 394 F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir. 2003); Central Dauphin School District, 109 LRP 14862 (Pa. SEA 2008) (Romberger). The Third Circuit has held that the educational benefit must be more than “trivial,” and must offer the potential for “significant learning” and “meaningful benefit.” Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. P.S., 172 F.3d 238, 247 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S. ex rel. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 2004) (appropriate IEPs must be “‘reasonably calculated’ to enable the child to receive ‘meaningful educational benefits’ in light of the child’s ‘intellectual potential’”).
 See 93 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 1 (Originally published in 2007).
 Rowley at 206-7.
 D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Ed., 602 F.3d 553 (3d Cir. 2010).
 See id at 560.
 Id at 565.
 L.R. v. Manheim Tp. Sch. Dist., 540 F. Supp. 2d 603, 618 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
 Rodrigues v. Fort Lee Bd. of Ed., 458 Fed. Appx. 124 (3d Cir. 2011).
 Van Duyn ex. rel. v. Baker Sch. Dist., 502 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2007).
 Id at 821-3; see also Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R., 200 F.3d 341, 349 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that a district’s failure to implement substantial provisions of an IEP amounts to a substantive violation of the IDEA); see also Derrick F. v. Red Lion Area Sch. Dist., 586 F. Supp. 2d 282, 299 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (adopting the approach taken in Van Duyn and Bobby R.).
 See Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1043-4 (5th Cir. 1989); see also T.R. v. Kingwood Twp. Bd. of Educ., 205 F.3d 572, 578 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Roncker On Behalf of Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1062-3 (6th Cir. 1983); see also Murray v. Montrose Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-IJ, 51 F.3d 921, 926 (10th Cir. 1995) (“one substantive requirement of the IDEA is to educate special education students in the least restrictive environment”); see also Oberti by Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Clementon Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 1204, 1213-5 (3d Cir. 1993).
 Daniel R.R. at 1039.
 Id at 1043-4.
 D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 249 (3d Cir. 2012) (quotations omitted).
 See id at 249-50 (holding that a delay in conducting an evaluation of a child that school officials know is likely to have a disability would “constitute a procedural Child Find violation”); see also D.A. ex rel. Latasha A. v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 629 F.3d 450, 453 (5th Cir. 2010) (discussing “a web of procedural regulations, including the ‘Child Find’ mandate”); see also Bd. of Educ. of Fayette Cnty., Ky. v. L.M., 478 F.3d 307, 313 (6th Cir. 2007).
 Sch. Bd. of the City of Norfolk v. Brown, 769 F. Supp. 2d 928, 944 (E.D. Va. 2010)
 Id at 945.
 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414 (2005).
 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(a)(1) (2005).
 See L.R. v. Manheim Tp. Sch. Dist., 540 F.Supp.2d 603 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (failure to make comprehensive language evaluation before creating IEP implicates procedural requirements); see also Smith v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 08-2215, 2010 WL 4861757, at *3 (2010) (“a failure to timely reevaluate is at base a procedural violation of IDEA”).
 See Fuhrmann on Behalf of Fuhrmann v. E. Hanover Bd. of Educ., 993 F.2d 1031, 1035 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding claims that school district violated the IDEA by failing to convene IEP team in a timely manner, modifying student’s IEP without consulting the student’s evaluation team, and unilaterally rejecting a potential placement were procedural claims).
 L.G., 486 Fed.Appx. 967 (3d Cir. 2012).
 Id at 972.
 R.B., ex rel. F.B. v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 496 F.3d 932, 940 (9th Cir. 2007).
 E.F. v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117143, *35 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) quoting Davis v. Wappingers Cent. Sch. Dist., 431 Fed. App. 12, 14 (2d Cir. 2011). See also Deal, 392 F.3d at 854; Michael J. v. Derry Tp. Sch. Dist., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5093, *44-*45 (M.D.Pa. 2006); D.B. v. New York City Dept. of Educ. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117745, *23 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
 Singletary v. Cumberland County Sch., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124659, *15 (E.D.N.C. 2013) citing DiBuo v. Bd. of Educ. of Worcestor County, 309 F.3d 184, 190 (4th Cir. 2002) see also C.H., 606 F.3d at 66; Deal, 393 F.3d at 854; Davis, 431 Fed. App. at 14; Wilson Area Sch. Dist., 110 LRP 17537 (Pa. SEA 2010) (Satriale); Pottstown Sch. Dist., 110 LRP 68536 (Pa. SEA 2010) (Satriale); D.B., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117745 at *23.
 C.H., 606 F.3d at 66; see also Deal, 393 F.3d at 854; County School Bd. of York County, Virginia v. A.L., 194 Fed. Appx. 173, 180 (4th Cir. 2006); L.M. v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 556 F.3d 900, 909 (9th Cir. 2008); DiBuo, 309 F.3d at 190; M.M. v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville County, 303 F.3d 523, 533 (4th Cir. 2002); Patterson v. Dist. of Columbia, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125742, *10 (D.D.C. 2013); E.F., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117143 at *36; Central Dauphin Sch. Dist., 109 LRP 14862 (Pa. SEA 2008)
 Davis, 431 Fed. Appx. at 5 citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii). See also C.H., 606 F.3d at 67; Wilson Area Sch. Dist., 110 LRP 17535 (Pa. SEA 2010)(Satriale); Pottstown Sch. Dist., 110 LRP 68536 (Pa. SEA 2010)(Satriale); Singletary, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124659 at *15; Doe v. Attleboro Public Sch., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35427, *19 (D. Mass. 2013); A.D. v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38757, *17 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); D.B., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117745 at *23-*24.
 A.L., 194 Fed. Appx. at 180 see also Deal, 392 F.3d at 854; DiBuo, 309 F.3d at 190; M.M., 303 F.3d at 533; Attleboro, 2013 U.S. Dist, LEXIS 35427 at *19.
 C.H., 606 F.3d at 66. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(F).
 R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Educ., 694 F.3d, 167, 190 (2d. Cir. 2012) see also A.D., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38757, at *17; E.F., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117143 at * 36.
 392 F.3d 840 (6th Cir. 2004).
 Id. at 857.
 194 Fed. Appx. 173 (4th Cir. 2006).
 Id. at 180.
 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124659 (E.D.N.C. 2013)
 Id. *17. In this case, it is noted that the Court was ruling on a Motion to Dismiss and simply had to accept as true the parent’s allegations.
 109 LRP 14862 (Pa. SEA 2008).
 392 F.3d 840 (6th Cir. 2004).
 Id. at 860-61.
 394 F.3d at 646.
 431 Fed. Appx. 12 (2d. Cir. 2011).
 Id. at 15.
 See Babb v. Knox Cnty. Sch. Sys., 965 F.2d 104, 108 (6th Cir. 1992).
 606 F.3d. 59 (3d. Cir. 2010).
 Id. at 68.
 Id. at 69-70 citing M.M., 303 F.3d 523. But see Knable v. Bexley City School Dist., 238 F.3d 755, 766-67 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that the failure to have a final IEP in place on the first day of school was a loss of educational opportunity where the IEP team only provided a draft and failed to hold a meeting).
 Id. at 70-71.
 303 F.3d 523, 534 (4th Cir. 2002)..
 556 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 2009).
 Id at 905.
 Id. at 910-11.
 371 Fed. Appx. 151 (2d Cir. 2010).
 Id. at 153-54.
 Id. at 154.
 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125742 (D.D.C. 2013).
 Id. at *11-*12.