Important Special Education Cases
We’ve organized important special education cases to help parents learn about their rights.
Burden of Proof
In Schaffer, the Supreme Court considered whether parents or school districts have the burden of proof in special education due process hearings. The Court determined that whichever party files a due process complaint has the burden of proof. So if a parent files a complaint alleging a denial of a free and appropriate public education (FAPE), the parent must prove the denial.
Free and Appropriate Public Education (FAPE)
Hendrick Hudson School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982)
Rowley is widely viewed as the landmark case in special education. In the decision, the Supreme Court identified the standard for FAPE. The court held that FAPE requires that a child’s Individualized Education Program (IEP) be designed to allow her to receive educational benefit. Since the case was decided, courts across the country have elaborated on this standard. In Pennsylvania and New Jersey, courts have held that a child must be provided the opportunity to make meaningful educational benefit.
Polk v. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit, 205 F.3d 572 (3d Cir. 1988)
Polk put forward the standard for FAPE in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which encompasses Pennsylvania, Delaware, and New Jersey. In Polk, the court stated that the primary goals of the IDEA are to foster self-sufficiency and provide students with disabilities full educational opportunity. Given these goals, the court held that FAPE requires students to be provided an opportunity to make meaningful progress in all major areas of need.
Ridgewood Board of Education v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 1999)
In Ridgewood, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals offered further guidance on the standard for FAPE. The court found that a student’s Individualized Education Program (IEP) did not provide him FAPE because it failed to enable him to receive “significant learning” and “meaningful benefit.” The court rejected the Ridgewood Board of Education’s argument that the student received FAPE because his IEP provided him with “more than trivial educational benefit.” In addition, the court held that the Board failed to give adequate consideration to the student’s intellectual potential when it crafted his IEP.
Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District, 580 U.S. 386 (2017)
In Endrew F., the Supreme Court revisited the standard for FAPE. The question presented to the Court was: What is the level of educational benefit that school districts must confer on children with disabilities to provide them FAPE, as guaranteed by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)? The Court concluded that school districts must offer children an IEP that is reasonably calculated to enable them to make progress appropriate in light of their circumstances.
Abigail P. v. Old Forge School District, 105 F.4th 57 (3d Cir. 2024)
This case involved a dispute over the proper application of the FAPE standard during the COVID-19 pandemic. Abigail P., a nine-year-old student with profound disabilities and extensive support needs, attended the Old Forge School District. During the pandemic, the District moved to remote instruction, and although staff acknowledged that Abigail needed in-person learning, the District refused her mother’s request for in-person attendance. Abigail received many, though not all, services remotely through an updated IEP, but her amount of one-on-one instruction was reduced, and she experienced both regression and limited progress. Her mother filed a due process complaint alleging denial of FAPE. The hearing officer ruled against her, and she appealed to federal court.
The case ultimately reached the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which upheld the hearing officer’s decision. The Third Circuit emphasized that federal courts must give due weight to a hearing officer’s factual determinations, and it concluded that Abigail’s IEP was appropriate when it was written, relied heavily on independent evaluations, and contained sufficient goals, supports, and related services to meet her needs. The Third Circuit also considered whether the District failed to implement the IEP by providing only remote instruction. In so doing, it adopted a “materiality” standard for IEP-implementation claims and found that remote instruction was not a material departure from Abigail’s IEP. Last, the Third Circuit rejected arguments that the pandemic allowed school districts to lower the standard for FAPE.
Coleman v. Pottstown School District, 581 Fed. App’x 141 (3d Cir. 2014)
In this case, the student, R.J., had a learning disability and transferred to the Pottstown School District in high school. When he transferred, he was reading at a first-grade level. The District provided him IEPs with one goal for reading, writing, and math; a small-classroom setting; a generic behavior improvement plan; and specialized reading instruction. R.J. earned passing grades in the District, but his reading level remained low. His family sued the District, arguing that his IEPs denied him FAPE. A special-education hearing officer ruled for the District, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the ruling.
The court emphasized (1) that the IDEA requires federal courts to afford hearing officer findings deference, and (2) that the IDEA requires only a “basic floor of opportunity.” The court explained that R.J.’s IEPs included appropriate supports and were reasonably calculated to confer meaningful benefit, as evidenced by R.J.’s passing grades and some progress in reading. The court rejected arguments that the IEPs were inadequate due to limited goals and boilerplate interventions, stressing that perfection is not required. Finally, the court noted that R.J.’s later progress in a private school did not retroactively render his earlier IEPs inappropriate.
Least Restrictive Environment (LRE)
Oberti v. Board of Education of the Borough of Clementon, 995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993)
In Oberti, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a two-part test for assessing compliance with the IDEA’s LRE requirement. First, a court must consider “whether education in the regular classroom, with the use of supplementary aids and services, can be achieved satisfactorily.” Factors the court should consider in applying this prong are: (1) the steps the school district has taken to accommodate the child in a regular classroom; (2) the child’s ability to receive an educational benefit from regular education; and (3) the effect the disabled child’s presence has on the regular classroom. Second, if the court finds that placement outside of a regular classroom is necessary for the child’s educational benefit, it must evaluate “whether the school has mainstreamed the child to the maximum extent appropriate, i.e., whether the school has made efforts to include the child in school programs with nondisabled children whenever possible.”
T.R. v. Kingwood Board of Education, 205 F.3d 572 (3d Cir. 2000)
In T.R., the Third Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the LRE issue in the context of preschools. The court held that a school district that does not operate a regular preschool program is not required to create one in order to satisfy the IDEA’s LRE requirement. However, the district must take into account a continuum of possible alternative placement options when formulating an IEP, including placing students with disabilities in private school programs for non-disabled preschool children.
Andrew M. v. Del. Cnty. Office of Mental Health, 490 F.3d 337 (3d Cir. 2007)
In Andrew M., the parents enrolled their twin toddlers in an inclusive preschool and requested that their county (which was responsible for providing early intervention services) deliver the toddlers’ services there, but the county refused to do so. The parents sued the county, arguing that under Part C of the IDEA, it had a duty to provide the toddlers early intervention services in their natural environment. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed. The court concluded that the county should have provided services in the preschool because (1) it was a community setting typical for nondisabled peers and (2) the county failed to justify delivering services in a different, more restrictive setting.
A.G. v. Wissahickon School District, 374 Fed. App’x 330 (3d Cir. 2010)
A.G., a non-verbal 18-year-old student with significant cognitive and physical disabilities, challenged the Wissahickon School District’s proposed placement in a full-time life-skills class, asserting that the placement violated the IDEA’s LRE requirement. A.G. sought full-time placement in a regular-education classroom, but the state special-education panel concluded that A.G. should be mainstreamed for only lunch, recess, specials, and one academic class. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling. Applying the Oberti framework, the court found that full-time placement in a regular-education classroom was not appropriate because the District had already provided A.G. extensive supplementary aids, A.G. made little progress in academic mainstream settings, and her behaviors significantly disrupted classmates. In the life-skills program, by contrast, A.G. made measurable progress in functional skills, supporting the finding that she received FAPE.
Child Find
A.B. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 841 Fed. App’x 392 (3d Cir. 2020)
A.B., a student with autism, received special education services from the Abington School District through 4th grade. But his parent did not believe the District was providing him a free and appropriate public education, and so the parent unilaterally enrolled him in a private school for children with disabilities. Over the next two years, the parent sent occasional emails to the District asking what “programs” the District could offer, but the parent never reenrolled A.B. in the District or requested a formal evaluation. In 2018, the parent requested public funding for A.B.’s private school under the IDEA, but a hearing officer, and later a federal district court, held that the District’s IDEA duties were never triggered because the parent did not sufficiently put the District on notice that the family sought IDEA services from it.
On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that the District’s IDEA responsibilities were not triggered because the parent neither requested an evaluation nor indicated an intent to reenroll A.B. during the relevant school years. Therefore, the District did not deny A.B. a free and appropriate public education, and the parent was not entitled to reimbursement for A.B.’s private school tuition. The Third Circuit emphasized that once a parent unilaterally places a child in a private school, a school district need not continue developing IEPs unless the parent initiates reenrollment or requests an evaluation.
Culley v. Cumberland Valley School District, 758 Fed. App’x 301 (3d Cir. 2018)
J.C., a student in the Cumberland Valley School District, suffered from Crohn’s disease, which affected his attendance, behavior, and academic performance. Despite knowing of his condition for years, the District provided only limited accommodations and ultimately expelled him after a disciplinary incident. His parents sued under the IDEA and Section 504, alleging that the District failed to properly identify and support his disability-related needs. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the District failed to fulfill its child-find obligations under both the IDEA and Section 504. The court rejected the District’s narrow view that a physical illness could not necessitate IDEA services and emphasized that J.C.’s condition impacted multiple aspects of his education. The court also held that the District had sufficient notice of J.C.’s struggles and diagnosis to trigger its duty to investigate and provide services earlier, rather than waiting for definitive proof from the parents.
Stay Put Protection
The Supreme Court in Honig held that the “stay-put” provision of the IDEA prohibits state or local school authorities from excluding a child with a disability from the classroom for dangerous or disruptive conduct that relates to the child’s disability. (The stay-put provision requires that a child remain in his then-current placement while statutory “proceedings” to resolve a dispute about the placement are pending.)
M.R. v. Ridley School District, 744 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 2014).
In M.R., the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that, when a hearing officer determines that a child’s educational placement is appropriate, the child is entitled to stay put in that placement throughout all federal disputes about the placement.
Under the IDEA, parents are eligible for an award of attorneys’ fees when they “prevail” in a case. In M.R., the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that parents are prevailing parties, and thus can obtain an award of fees, when they successfully enforce their right to reimbursement for a stay put placement. That is so even if the parents do not prevail on their underlying IDEA claim. Denying fees in such cases, the court explained, would undermine parents’ ability to enforce stay put rights and frustrate the IDEA’s goal of ensuring children with disabilities receive a free and appropriate public education.
E.M., a ten-year-old student with multiple disabilities, attended the Learning Center for Exceptional Children (LCEC), a private school for children with disabilities in New Jersey. Her IEP required that she be integrated into classes with regular-education students at Today’s Learning Center (TLC), a private school that shared space with LCEC. The New Jersey Department of Education (NJDOE) directed LCEC not to place public-school students with disabilities in classes with TLC’s students, asserting that such integrated classes were not approved. LCEC, under protest, complied. E.M.’s parents then sued NJDOE, seeking an injunction under the IDEA stay put provision to allow her to continue attending integrated classes.
A federal court issued the injunction, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals kept it in place. The Third Circuit determined that E.M.’s lawsuit was a valid proceeding under the IDEA because it challenged a state action that interfered with her IEP and the provision of FAPE. It further found that the NJDOE’s directive constituted a potential change in E.M.’s educational placement because, applying a functional test, it would significantly affect her learning experience by removing the integrated classes that were a cornerstone of her IEP. Consequently, the Third Circuit remanded the case for further fact-finding on whether alternative placements could implement her IEP, while keeping the preliminary injunction in force to maintain the status quo for E.M. during the ongoing proceedings.
DeLeon v. Susquehanna Community School District, 747 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1984)
DeLeon presented the question whether a change in the method of transportation for a student with disabilities constitutes a change in “educational placement” under the IDEA’s “stay-put” provision. The school district in DeLeon changed the child’s transportation from a personal transportation to a shared transportation arrangement with other students, which slightly increased his travel time. The parents objected, arguing this change would harm the child and constituted a modification of his educational program. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the change did not constitute a change in educational placement because it did not significantly impact the child’s educational experience. While transportation is a related service, the court explained, the change (a slight increase in travel time and a shift to shared transportation) did not meaningfully affect the child’s ability to benefit from education.
Tuition Reimbursement
Florence County School District v. Carter (1993) & Burlington School Committee v. Mass. Department of Educ. (1985)
Although Carter was decided 8 years after Burlington, these cases are often cited together; their holdings are commonly referred to as the “Carter-Burlington Test.” Courts use the Carter-Burlington Test to determine whether a parent should receive reimbursement for private school tuition under the IDEA. The Test has 3 parts:
1. Did the school district provide the student with an appropriate education?
2. If not, was the placement chosen by the parent appropriate?
3. Do the equities favor reimbursement?
Who is a “Parent” under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act?
Adult Q.T. v. Pottsgrove Sch. Dist., 70 F.4th 663 (3d Cir. 2023)
H.P.-B., a student, lived with her adult cousin, Q.T., within the Pottsgrove School District. Q.T. did not have legal custody of H.P.-B. (custody was held by the grandmother, E.E.), but Q.T. acted as H.P.-B.’s educational decision-maker, requesting disability evaluations and participating in meetings with the school. After Pottsgrove determined H.P.-B. was ineligible for special-education services under the IDEA, Q.T. filed a due process complaint alleging a denial of FAPE. The school district moved to dismiss, arguing Q.T. was not a “parent” under the IDEA and therefore lacked standing. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, however, disagreed. It explained that under the IDEA, “parent” includes “an[y] individual acting in the place of a natural or adoptive parent . . . with whom the child lives, or an individual who is legally responsible for the child’s welfare.” And the court found that Q.T. met this statutory definition as an “other relative” with whom the child resided and who was legally responsible for her welfare.
Standard of Review in a Special Education Appeal
Le Pape v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 103 F.4th 966 (3d Cir. 2024)
Alex Le Pape, a non-verbal student with autism and a speech-and-language impairment, requested that the Lower Merion School District implement a particular communication method for him (Spelling to Communicate (S2C)). The District declined to do so, however, citing concerns about S2C’s efficacy. Alex’s parents later withdrew him from school due to increased anxiety and behaviors that resulted from him not having access to S2C. Then, they requested a special-education due process hearing and sought compensatory education, tuition reimbursement, and damages, claiming violations under the IDEA, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Section 504). The hearing officer ruled against the parents, and they appealed to federal court.
The appeal presented the question of what standard of review applies to Section 504 and ADA claims that are raised as part of an IDEA appeal. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately determined that, unlike the IDEA’s modified de novo review, those claims warrant de novo review and may entitle parents to a jury trial where genuine factual disputes exist.
Disability Discrimination under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Act
A.G. v. Lower Merion School District, 542 Fed. App’x 193 (3d Cir. 2013)
A.G., a student in the Lower Merion School District (LMSD), received speech therapy and special education services beginning in third grade. Over the years, LMSD repeatedly evaluated her, ultimately shifting her disability classification from a learning disability to “Other Health Impairment.” Her parents consistently approved her IEPs and program adjustments. During her senior year, after her father questioned her disability status and sought an independent evaluation, A.G. filed suit under Section 504 and the ADA, alleging that LMSD improperly placed her in special-education classes.
The central issue in the case was whether A.G. produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that LMSD acted with deliberate indifference (the standard required to obtain compensatory damages under Section 504 and the ADA) by regarding her as disabled and placing her in special-education classes. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled for LMSD. It explained that deliberate indifference requires actual knowledge of a violation, not negligence, procedural missteps, or what the district “should have known.” And A.G., the Third Circuit concluded, did not show that LMSD knew that it had misidentified her as a child with disabilities. A.G.’s evidence included her dissatisfaction with her program, alleged flaws in LMSD’s evaluations, and LMSD’s changes to her disability classification. But none of that evidence established that LMSD knew that it had likely misidentified A.G.